Herbert Marcuse once observed that religion contams a "basic ambivalence," that is, an ambivalence that persists as a result of the unresolved tension between "the image of dommation and the image of liberation" at the heart of religious consciousness.' For Marcuse, religion demes the hope for peace, justice and happiness that it once aroused m human bemgs by teachmg them "to appreciate the facts m a world of alienatIon.,,2 The link between religion and the desire for a just world identified by Marcuse derives from Marx's definition of religion as "the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world ... the spirit of spiritless conditions."' For Marx, religion detaches the legitimate desire for justice on earth from concrete historical struggles, with the result that human bemgs are directed to find their happmess m illusions, rather than m the actual conditions of their life expenence. That is why for Marx the cntique of religion is central to "the premise of all cnticism": with the abolition of religion and its compensating illusions, the "task of history" as the establishment of "the truth of this world'4 becomes possible.
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The idea that the abolition of religion is requisite to the struggle for social transformation is predicated on the recogmtion that, m the words of Max Horkheimer, "[dissatisfaction with earthly destiny is the strongest motive for acceptance of a transcendental bemg." Following Marx, both Horkheimer this paper grew out of a paper read at a session on "Contemporary Feminist Theory and the Study of Religion" at the North Amencan Association for the Study of Religion annual meetmg, San Francisco, November 20, 1992 . 2 Marcuse, 1962 , 65-66. 3 Marx, 1975 and Marcuse argue that religion is the spmtualization or alienation of the human longing for a better, more humane existence, and that religious belief in the possibility of "a perfect justice" beyond history conceals the impotence of human beings to effectively change their conditions. It is not only, then, that religion offers an escape from pamful reality; it is also that religion mystifies this escape by providing the further illusion that engaged, historical struggle agamst oppression and dommation is irrelevant to a more genuine, or 'higher' form of salvation. The dialectic of domination and liberation identified by Marx, Marcuse, and Horkheimer as central to religion may be seen to correspond, beyond the field of religion, to the dialectic of theory and ideology that surfaces m contemporary cntical discourses onented to emancipation.
The tension between theory and ideology that resides within critical thought is the focus of Horkheimer's and Theodor Adorno's mquiry into the "self-destruction of the Enlightenment."
In their diagnosis of the pathology of modernity, Horkheimer and Adorno ask why humankind "is smkmg mto a new kind of barbarism," the result of the failure of the Enlightenment. In then attempt to answer this question, Horkheimer and Adorno explore the mternal dialectic of reason itself, where the tension between substantive and instrumental rationality becomes gradually resolved in the triumph of reason as purposive and techmcal mastery over nature. With the ascendancy of instrumental reason, the possibility of reason directed toward justice, freedom, and happmess disappears, and with it, the related possibility of a humane society that values people as ends rather than means.
Instrumental reason coincides with the logic of capitalism, such that "thought inevitably becomes a commodity, and language the means of promoting that commodity."5 Ideology emerges m the commodification of thought, submergmg the cntical power of theory to mterrogate its own concepts. Since the tension between ideology and cntique is always at work in theory, a consciously cntical theory must continuously examme its own internal tendencies toward reification m order to prevent that which is human from becommg absorbed within abstract concepts that are severed from material existence. Emancipatory theories contain that ambivalence between images of domination and liberation described by Marcuse, and this tension threatens at every turn closure of the cntical process. In the case of Chnstianity, Marcuse locates this kmd of closure as takmg place m the "transubstantiation of the Messiah" and "his gospel," along with their removal from "this world."6 According to Marcuse, the displacement of Jesus' message of liberation from the realm of history resulted m the 5 Horkheuner and Adomo, 1972 , xi-xii. 6 Marcuse, 1962 
